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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Assisted Living Concepts, Inc. ("ALC") appeals from a decision of the Industrial 
Commission ("the Commi,ssion") awarding unemployment benefits to Brooke A. Stark ("Stark"). 
ALC asks this Court to overturn the Commission's Decision and Order awarding Stark 
unemployment benefits and it asks thal Lhe Courl direct the Commission to deny Stark benefits. 
B'. Proceedings Below. 
This appeal has its genesis in a claim for unemployment benefits Stark filed with 
the Department of Labor ("the Department"). On December 27, 2010, Appeals Examiner 
Thomas' Holden held a telephonic hearing in this matter, in which testimony was heard and 
evidence presented. Decision of Appeals Examiner, R. I. The Appeals Examiner issued a 
determination in which he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 1. The 
Examiner found that Stark was not eligible for unemployment benefits because she was 
discharged for insubordination, which is misconduct under Idaho Code Section 72-1366(5). 
Stark appealed this decision to the Commission. R. 7. On February 28, 2011, the 
Commission filed the Decision and Order that is the subject of this appeal. R. 21. In its 
Decision, the Commission (with some changes and omissions) adopted the Appeals Examiner's 
findings of fact. R. 21. The Commission cone! uded that ALC did not establish misconduct, and 
that Stark's actions fell within an exception to misconduct. R. 21. The Commission ordered that 
ALC' s account be chargeable for any benefits that Stark received. R. 21. ALC then filed its 
Notice of Appeal to the Court on April 11, 201 I. R. 30. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
ALC operates assisted living facilities. Claimant Brooke Stark ("Stark") was 
employed by ALC from April 21, 2008, through October 29, 2010. Tr. p. 14, LL. 16-18. Stark 
was the residence director of Sylvan House, an assisted living facility. Tr. p. J 4, LL. 19-20. 
On Friday, October 29, 2010, Stark spoke on the telephone with Matt Cable 
("Cable"), who was the regtonal director of sales and marketing for ALC, to discuss various 
work topics. Tr. p. 14, L. 25 top. 15, L. 4. Cable was a member ofregional management who 
covered both Sylvan House (where Stark was employed), as well as several other facilities, 
including one named Teton House. Tr. p. 6, LL. 14-16. During that conversation, Stark 
informed Cable that she had information that Teton House was closing. Tr. p. 6, LL. 5-13; p. 15, 
LL. 5-11. Cable was very concerned about the information the Stark had provided about Teton 
House closing, and later that day he contacted divisional director of Human Resources, Craig 
Boyes ("Boyes") and informed him of this development. Tr. p. 6, LL. 5-10. 
That evening, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Boyes called Stark and told her he had 
had a conversation with Cable and that Cable had asked if Teton House was, in fact, closing. 
Tr. p. 15, LL. 12-16. Because this infonnation that Teton House was closing was important and 
could have negative affects on other employees and residents, Boyes believed it was necessary to 
get to the root of the matter. Tr. p. 6, LL. 16-21; p. 19, LL. 6-18. When Boyes asked Stark 
where she obtained her information that Teton House was closing, Stark informed Boyes that she 
had "lots of sources, lots of friends within the company, and that [she] didn't feel it necessary to 
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reveal a confidence that was told to [her] and that [she] wasn't going to tell him." Tr. p. 15, 
LL. 13-20. 
Boyes considered the information about Teton House closing so important that he 
immediately called ALC's President and CEO, Lori Bebo ("Bebo"). Tr. p. 5, LL. 17-19; p. 6., 
LL. 10-21; p. 19, LL. 16-18. Bebo also considered Stark's information that Teton House was 
closing to be "very important." Tr. p. 6, LL. 25- p. 7, L. 2. Approximately five minutes later, 
Boyes called Stark again and added Bebo to the call. Tr. p. 15, LL. 21-23; p. 6, LL. 21-24. 
Rumors of closing were not common. Tr. p. 19, L. 6. Such rnmors have negative implications 
from a company perspective and also for members of the Teton House community, including 
families, residents and employees. Tr. 19, LL. 16-18. Bebo had never had any direct dealings 
with other rumors of houses closing, and the rnrnor that Teton House was closing was taken 
extremely seriously by Bebo, Boyes and Cable (as shown by their immediate response to locate 
the source of this information). Tr. p. 19, LL. 6-18. 
Bebo asked Stark if she told Cable earlier that day that Teton House was closing, 
and Stark indicated she had done so. Tr. p. 7, LL. 2-4. When Bebo asked Stark who told her 
that information, Stark informed Bebo that it could have been a number of people. Tr. p. 7, 
LL. 4-7. Bebo stressed to Stark that infonnation relating to the closure of Teton House was very 
important. Bebo specifically informed Stark that she wanted to put an end to the rumors. 
Tr. p. 17, LL. 3-4. This information was very recent, and Bebo pointedly asked Stark who had 
passed on that information to her. Tr. p. 7, LL. 7-9. Stark informed Bebo that she did not want 
to share that information. Tr. p. 7, LL. 10-11. Again, Bebo asked Stark if she understood how 
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important this infonnation was, because ALC needed stop any further rumors, because ALC 
needed to infom1 personnel to assure them and let them know that the rumor was w1true. Stark 
told Bebo she understood the importance. 1 Tr. p. 7, LL. 11-17. 
Finally, after explaining how important this information was and emphasizing 
why ALC needed to know who told Stark that Teton House was closing, Bebo specifically 
directed Stark to answer "who had provided you with the information that Teton House was 
closing." Tr. p. 7, LL. 17-19. Stark told Bebo that she would not share that information. Stark 
further stated she would have to "take one for the team." Tr. p. 7; LL. 17-21. 
At that point, when Stark point-blank refused to answer a direct request of the 
President and CEO of the company, Bebo placed Stark under suspension, pending an 
investigation. Bebo informed Stark that divisional director of Human Resources, Craig Boyes, 
would follow up with her. Tr. p. 7, LL. 21-24. 
ALC's vice president of Human Resources, Rick Parker ("Parker"), conducted an 
investigation into Stark's refusal to provide the infonnation requested by ALC. Tr. 11, LL. 8-11. 
Parker's investigation confirmed the following: That Stark had infom1ed Matt Cable that a 
building was closing (Teton House), which caused concern for Cable; that Cable then called 
Boyes; that Boyes then called Stark, who refused to tell Boyes who had shared that information 
with her; that Boyes then contacted President and CEO, Lori Bebo, who in tum called Stark and 
1 At the hearing, however, Stark contradicted herself and testified that she did not believe 
that a rumor concerning a house closing would directly influence the company. Tr. p. 17, 
LL. 21-23. 
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asked her source of infmmation that Teton House was closing; that again Stark refused to tell 
Bebo; and that Stark infonned Bebo that she would have to take one for the team. Tr. p. 12, 
LL 1-19. 
As a result of his investigation, Parker concluded that Stark refused to follow a 
direct order from a supervisor, and that refusal constituted insubordination, which was Class 3 
infraction in ALC's employee handbook. Tr. p. 12, L. 25 - p. 13, L. 3. A Class 3 infraction can 
result in discharge, with no warning. Tr. p. 8, LL. 6-10. Accordingly, Stark was discharged for 
refusal to follow a direct order from a supervisor, insubordination. Tr. p. 8, LL. 22 - p. 9, L. 3; 
Exhibit 4, p. 7. She was discharged effective on the date of her suspension, October 29, 2010. 
Tr. p. 8, LL. 16-21. 
ALC's concerns over the seriousness of the rumors were later substantiated, as 
this rumor caused families to move out of Teton House, and ALC was then forced to close the 
building. Tr. p. 9, LL. 7-11. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission's finding that Claimant did not engage 
in misconduct is substantiated by competent evidence. 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission's decision is contrary to the evidence 
presented. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
This Court exercises free review over the Industrial Conunission's legal 
conclusions. Laundry v. Franciscan Health Care Ctr., 125 Idaho 279, 869 P.2d 1374 (1994), see 
also Moore v. Melaleuca, 137 Idaho 23, 43 P.3d 782 (2002). The Industrial Commission's 
decision must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Uhl v. Ballard Med. 
Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id., citing 
Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 P.3d 211 (2000). Substantial evidence is more 
than a scintilla of proof, but less than a prepondernnce. Bre,ver v. La Crosse Health & Rehab., 
138 Idaho 859, 861, 71 P.3d 458 (2003). The court also must set aside an order of the 
Commission where it fails to make a proper application of the law to the evidence. Bortz v. 
Payless Drug Store, 110 Idaho 942,945,719 P.2d 1202, 1205 (1986). 
B. The Commission's Conclusion -That Stark Did NOT Engage in Misconduct 
Ily Refusing To Provide Her Superiors with Important Requested 
Information - Is Not Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence. 
An employee is not eligible for unemployment benefits if the unemployment is 
the result of "discharge[] for misconduct in connection with his employment." IDAHO CODE 
§ 72-1366(5). Whether the discharge for misconduct is work-related "is a factual 
dete1mination." Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P .2d 11 51, 1152 ( 198 6). 
Employment-related misconduct includes any of the following:"( l) a willful, intentional 
disregard of the employer's interest; (2) a deliberate violation of the employer's reasonable rules; 
6 Clierit:2124242.1 
or (3) a disregard of a standard of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his 
employees." Kivalu v. Life Care Ctrs. ofArn., 142 Idaho 262,264, 127 P.Jd 165, 167 (2005); 
IDAP A 09 .0 I 30.275 .02. "The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the 
evidence falls strictly on the employer, and where the burden is not met, benefits must be 
awarded to the claimant." Harris v. Wholesale, 141 Idaho I, 3,105 P.3d 267,269 (2004); 
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01. 
The Commission must consider all three grounds when detennining whether an 
employee's termination was a result of employment-related misconduct. Smith v. Zero Defects, 
Inc., 132 Idaho 88 l, 884, 980 P.2d 545, 548 (1999). The focus of the inquiry is not whether the 
employer's reason for discharge was reasonable but, rather, whether the misconduct was work-
related so as lo make the employee ineligible for unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City ofldaho 
Falls, 110 Idaho 891,892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986). 
In this case, the Commission failed to consider al 1 three grounds for misconduct 
and instead determined that the issue could be disposed of under the standard of behavior test 
and, tlms, based its decision on the unsupportable ground that Stark's refusal to divulge the 
source of the rumor did not fall below the reasonable standard of behavior an employer is 
entitled to expect The Commission completely failed to consider whether Stark's refusal to 
provide requested information demonstrated a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's 
interest. 
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1. Stark's point-blank refusal to provide information requested by 
ALC's President and CEO falls below the standard of behavior 
expected by a reasonable employer. 
Under the standard of behavior test, the employer must prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that (1) the employee's conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by 
the employer; and (2) the employer's expectations were objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances. Harris, 141 Idaho at 4, 105 P.3d at 270; IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02(c). Generally, 
an employer's burden of proof under the standard of behavior test does not require a showing 
that the employee's conduct was willful, intentional, or deliberate. Harris, 141 Idaho at 4, I 05 
P.3d at 270. The first prong of the test addresses only what the employer subjectively expected 
from the employee, while the second prong considers whether the employer's expectations are 
reasonable. The record establishes that ALC subjectively expected Stark to disclose the identity 
of the person within the organization that told her of the rumor that Teton House was closing. 
Therefore, what this Court must detennine is whether substantial and competent evidence 
supports the Commission's conclusion - that ALC's expectation that Stark disclose the source of 
the information about the closure of Teton House - was NOT objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances. The record does not support the Commission's conclusion. 
In order for an employer's expectation to be objectively reasonable, the 
expectation must be communicated to the employee, unless the expectation is the type that flows 
naturally from the employment relationship. Id. An expectation flows naturally from the 
employment relationship when the expectations are co1mnon among employees in general or 
within a particular enterprise. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dep 't of labor v. J.R. Simplot Co., 
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131 Idaho 318,322,955 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1998). Such expectations are generally limited to 
fundamental expectations and do not involve specific rules unless clearly embodied in the job at 
issue. See, e.g., Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432,435, 974 P.2d 78, 81 (1999) (holding 
that a retail employer has a reasonable expectation flowing naturally from the employment 
relationship that its employees will not make vulgar comments about coworkers and supervisors 
in the presence of customers and other coworkers); Bullard v. Sun Valley Aviation, Inc., 128 
Idaho 430, 434, 914 P.2d 564, 568 (1996) (finding that an employer's expectation that an 
employee will comply with federal rules and the employer's manual, which both required 
permission prior to crossing a runway, flowed naturally from a line service position at an 
ai1vort). In other words, the relevant question is whether the employee has breached "a standard 
of behavior that would flow normally from an employment relationship or which was 
communicated to [the employee] because of its uncommon nature." Wuljf v. Sun Valley Co., 127 
Idaho 71, 75, 896 P.2d 979,983 (1995). 
In this case, there was a reasonable expectation that employees will answer 
questions put to them by the President and CEO of the company. Such an expectation flows 
naturally from the employment relationship. See Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 974 
P.2d 78 (1999). This expectation is supported by a clear policy- set fo1th in the employee 
handbook - that prohibited insubordination. President and CEO Bebo explained to Stark why it 
was important for ALC to know who was spreading rumors and specifically directed Stark to 
infonn her who had told her. Stark point-blank refused. ALC's reasons for wanting to know the 
origins of the rumor were reasonable - ALC needed to stop the rumor from continuing and 
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needed to prevent any further damage to ALC's interests. To do so, it was imperative for ALC 
to find out the source of the rnmor in order to put a stop to it. 
The Commission's finding that Stark's refusal to disclose the source of the rumor 
was reasonable is wholly without support in the record. The evidence can only support the 
conclusion that Stark's refusal to disclose the source of the mmor was conduct that fell below a 
standard of behavior that ALC had a right to expect. 
2. The Commission's conclusion - that ALC's directive to identify the 
source of the rumor was NOT reasonable - is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
The Commission found that "the Commission is not inclined to find Employer's 
directive reasonable in this case." R. 21, p. 6. Surprisingly, the Commission found that ALC's 
directive was not reason ab le because there was no evidence that identifying the cause of the 
mmor would allow ALC to stop it(" ... there is no indication that Employer's objective would 
be met unless Claimant revealed her source."). R. 21, p. 7. Incredibly, the Commission found 
that in order to stop the rumor, ALC should not wony about finding the source of that rumor, but 
should instead use "more viable options such as holding a meeting or distributing a memo." Id. 
In reaching this result, the Commission completely disregarded the ONLY testimony on point -
the testimony of the President and CEO, who testified that ALC needed to know the source of 
the rumor to adequately protect ALC's interests. It is axiomatic that the way to stop a rumor is to 
go to the source of that rumor. Somehow, this essential fact seems to have escaped the 
Commission. 
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Moreover, the Commission glossed over the evidence that ACL interests were 
adversely impacted by the rumor, as Teton House had closed: " ... there is little evidence that 
Claimant's failure to abide by Employer's directive directly caused harm." R. 21 p. 7. President 
and CEO Bebo -- ce1iainly in a position to know - testified that Teton had lost residents and had 
closed due to the rumor. 
The Commission's conclusory assumptions as to the best way to stop a rumor are 
not suppo1ied by substantial and competent evidence. ACL's directive to the director of one of 
its assisted living units to identify the source of a rumor that could cause, and did cause, harm to 
ACL's interests was reasonable. 
C. The Record Lacks Substantial, Competent Evidence To Support the 
Commission's Determination That Stark's Refusal To Provide Her Superiors 
with Important Requested Information Was a "Good Faith Error in 
Judgment or Discretion." 
In its Decision and Order, the Commission detennined that, even if ALC' s 
directive to Stark to divulge the source of the rumor that Teton House was closing was 
reasonable, "this situation falls with an exception to misconduct," citing IDAPA 
09.01.30.275.03. R. 21, p. 7. That section provides: 
03. Inability to Perform or Ordinary Negligence. Mere 
inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure of good performance 
as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, isolated 
instances ofordinary negligence, or good faith errors in judgment 




The Commission based this determination on the fact that "there is no indication 
Claimant had a history of insubordination," and there is "little evidence" that Stark's refusal 
caused harm. R. 21, p. 7. Finally, the Commission found that there was no indication thaL ALC 
learning of the source would limit any harm. R. 21, p. 7. 
Stark was asked several times by her superiors (Boyes and Bebo) to divulge the 
source of the rumor. The company President and CEO explained to Stark how and why this 
information was important, and that ALC needed the infonnation to stop rumors from spreading 
and alleviate any ham1 the rumor had caL1sed. Stark flat out refused to answer this reasonable 
request by her superior. There is no evidence in the record - much less substantial evidence - to 
support the Commission's conclusion that Stark's refusal to respond to Bebo's reasonable 
directive to provide information was a "good faith error in judgment." 
D. The Commission Failed To Consider Whether Stark's Refusal To Provide 
Legitimately Requested Information Was a "Willful, Intentional Disregard 
of the Employer's Interest" 
Besides disregard of the employer's expected standard of behavior and deliberate 
violation of the employer's reasonable rules, the supreme court has held that misconduct includes 
"a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest." Kivalu, 142 Idaho at 264, 127 P.3d 
at 167. As stated above, the Commission must consider all three grounds when determining 
whether an employee's termination was a result of employment-related misconduct. Smith, 132 
Idaho at 884, 980 P.2d at 548. 
In this case, the Commission failed to consider all three grounds for misconduct 
and instead determined that the issue could be disposed of under the standard of behavior test 
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and, thus, based its decision on the unsupp01iable ground that Stark's refusal to divl1lge the 
source of the rnmor did not fall below the reasonable standard of behavior an employer is 
entitled to expect. The Commission completely failed to consider whether Stark's refusal to 
provide requested information demonstrated a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's 
interest. The appeals examiner, however, specifically addressed this issue: 
The claimant's conduct in refusing to disclose the source of the 
rumor was conduct that fell below a standard of behavior that the 
employer had a right to expect, and.also demonstrated a willful 
disregard for the employer's interests. 
R. 1, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
The record evidence suppo1is this analysis. President and CEO Lori Bebo 
explained to Stark the importance of this infomrntion and why ALC needed it. Bebo stressed to 
Stark that this recent infomrntion or rumor relating to the closure of Teton House was important 
and specifically infonned Stark that she wanted to put an end to the rumors. Bebo asked Stark if 
she understood how imp01iant this information was, because ALC needed stop any further 
rnmors, because ALC needed to infonn personnel to assure them and let them know that the 
rumor was untrne. Stark acknowledged to Bebo she understood that importance. Tr. p. 17, 
LL. 3-4; p. 7, LL. 11-17. 
Despite the President and CEO's detailed explanations, Stark subjectively did not 
believe this information was important and refused to provide the infonnation her superior 
directed her to provide. The Claimant then flippantly stated that she would simply have to take 
one for the team. These actions demonstrate Stark's willful disregard for ACL's interest. 
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The Commission's failure to analyze whether Stark's actions were in willfo1 
disregard of ALC's interests, especially considering the record evidence that the withheld 
information was important to ALC's interest, and that this was conveyed directly to Stark, is 
reversible error. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests this Court set aside the 
Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered in this matter, as it is 
unsubstantiated by any comp~e;~ 7vidence, and is contrary to the evidence presented. 
DATED thi;~y of July, 2011. 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, R 
FIELDS CHARTERED 
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